MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE


On November 21st, 1980 there was a tragic fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada, which subsequently resulted in the unfortunate deaths of 85 hotel employees and guests (Bryan, 1981). The hotel was built in 1973 on 43 acres of land and was considered to be one of the largest hotels in its era. The official address of the hotel was 3645 Las Vegas Blvd; the gaming space of hotel consisted of over 65,000 sq. ft. of sprawling space. The hotel consisted of 21 stories (Bryan, 1981). The hotel was partially sprinklered; there significant areas of the hotel which were not sprinklered. The hotel consisted of the following main areas: showrooms, casino, restaurant, Deli, mercantile complex, convention facilities, and jai alai fronton. The hotel was built by Kirk Kerkorian; the hotel contained 2,084 rooms (Bryan, 1981).
According to official reports, there was nearly 600 people injured; 35 fire fighters needed medical attention during and consequently after the fire. The fire started in the casino restaurant and progressed upward to the rest of the hotel (Bryan, 1981). According to the official hotel registry, there were 3,400 guests staying at the hotel during the time of the fire. At the time of the fire, there was construction going on an adjacent tower, which was left undamaged (NFPA, 1980). The fire caused extensive damage and outlined the need for improved new fire and safety codes. This was important since up until this point, there fire and safety codes did not represent a uniform standard of fire safety. The codes from the MGM Grand have been implemented worldwide. The significance of the fire is multi-factorial in nature; however we cannot discount the innocent loss of life, which could have been saved with strict fire and safety code enforcement (NFPA, 1980).
The MGM Grand represents an enlightening look an archaic fire and safety system, which was altered and modeled to ensure complete safety of hotel guests, hotel staff, and fire fighters. In this essay, we will espouse the details involving the fire, discuss the response, and further articulate the limitations of the old system, while advocating shortcomings and suggesting further improvements in the quality of fire safety (NFPA, 1980). In this essay, we will use primary references from the Clark County Fire Department records. These records will ensure quality satisfaction of the information and further encrypt any extraneous variables which may be mis-represented by eye-witness accounts or other trivial news articles. The Clark County Record provides an accurate, valid, and significant report where thoughtful insight can be gleaned from the official record of one of the worst fires in American history. Officially, it was the second largest life-loss hotel fire in America’s history (NFPA, 1980).
According to the Clark County Fire Department, the genesis of the fire most probably resulted from faulty electrical ground fault. Furthermore, the investigators surmised that several factors could have contributed to the fire (CCFD, 1981). Nonetheless, the official report states the fire most likely came from the wall suffix of the side stand in the Deli. The Deli was one of five major restaurants located near the casino floor. Ultimately, the investigators reached the conclusion that the ignition of the fire came primarily from the electrical ground fault (CCFD, 1981). The Deli was close due to construction and was not yet open for business. According to the official report, at 7:05 am, a manager of a tile and marble company came to Deli to check the area for broken tiles (CCFD, 1981). He first noticed a flickering light; he continued his examination and discovered flames coming from a wall. He states that the flames were traveling from the countertop to the ceiling.
The manager called hotel security and told them about the fire. He then secured a hose line and obtained a fire extinguisher. The manager tried to put the fire out himself or at the very minimum contain the fire but he was unsuccessful (CCFD, 1981).
There were a myriad of factors going against him: collaboration of smoke, intense heat and pressure. Each time he made an attempt to enter the Deli; those synergistic forces propelled him to the ground. The gravitational forces were so strong and against him; he made the wise and important decision to depart from the area and seek additional help. During this time, several people tried unsuccessfully to put out the flames using fire extinguishers, however they failed since the fire was getting out of control and was too large to extinguish at that particular time (CCFD, 1981). Participants in the casino at that time notices black smoke coming from the Deli premises.
At that point, flames were seen coming out from the entrance of the building. It did not take very long for the fire to reach its full-onslaught. The fire received its impetus from paper and plastic. They were pictures along the wall and the fire gained momentum from mixing with the paper and plastic (CCFD, 1981). Further, it is noted that the fire smoldered for a significant time before it broke into the wall. In merely six minutes since the manager discovered the fire, the main casino area was heavily occupied in the midst of the fire. According to official estimates, the burning speed was anywhere from 15 to 19 feet per second (CCFD, 1981). This is an important figure and should be noted with particular attention. There is a direct correlation between the speed of the fire and the extent of damage.
The first call to the Clark County Fire Department was acknowledged at 7:17 am, respectively. The fire engine #11 arrived at 7:19 am (CCFD, 1981). The captain was Rex Smith. The engineer was Chad Marshall, who was accompanied to the fire scene with fellow firefighters: Ted Singer, Toby Lamuraglia, and Bert Sweeney. They choose to position the 1,500 GPM fire engine at the Northern point of the casino for strategically defined points (CCFD, 1981). Also, upon arrival, they instigated the High Rise Preplan.
When the firefighters entered the casino main floor, they observed the appearance of black smoke. This black smoke was coming from the Deli area. The fire crew was only 40 feet into the hotel and an enormous “fireball” erupted from the Deli and moved into the main area of the casino (NFPA, 1980). According to the National Fire Protection Association’s Report, one of the firefighters stated, “I saw three or four people coming out of the delicatessen area, and they started running across this ramp to these doors in front of us. At that time, all of us stopped You can see sort of a stratified layer of black smoke At the same time we noticed this stratified layer which was probably down about six to eight feet from the ceiling. A fireball and a heavy dense black cloud with a little bit of flame visible in the perimeter of the flames started rolling out… When we got to the doors, it felt like the fire had pushed us outside, the smoke had dropped so fast” (NFPA, 1980).
The fire crew had to abandon the area and swiftly proceeded away from the premises. This was an important and wise move since their life was in grave danger at that point in time. The hotel did not contain sprinklers (NFPA, 1980).
According to experts, many surmise that the fire would have been prevented if a proper sprinkler system would have been installed. Furthermore, they suggest that the MGM Grand fire would have been a two sprinkler fire if such a system existed. During the construction in early 1970s, hotel executives were more concerned with future profits rather than embracing social responsibility and a concern for the health of future hotel guests and staff. Fire marshalls of Clark County begged the hotel executives to install sprinklers, but they were reluctant (NFPA, 1980). It is a shame that the Fire Marshalls did not get a mandatory injunction from the City Council to authorize an obligatory sprinkler system or construction would have been stopped immediately. This could have prevented the worst fire seen in the history of the state of Nevada and saved nearly a hundred lives. Officials estimate that the sprinklers would have only $192,000; this was a fraction of the entire cost of the hotel which was estimated at $106 million dollars.
According to the National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA) Report (1980) on the MGM Grand, the Deli received a special exemption for not needing to have the sprinklers. It was thought since it was a 24 hour restaurant, there would no need for sprinklers since an employee would always be present and could out any substantial fire with the use of a fire extinguisher. This was completely absurd logic and further shows the MGM management as practicing negligence, carelessness, and un-ethical behavior. At the time of the fire, the Deli was closed and there were no employees in the area (NFPA, 1980).
According to the NFPA’s report, the manager who was first at the scene of fire was not properly trained in fire and safety and furthermore he could not even find a single fire extinguisher. This is contrary to what we have stated earlier (NFPA, 1980). According to NFPA report, none of the employees could find a single fire extinguisher. In the report, there was a local firefighter on the scene of the fire, who was a guest at the hotel and he described great difficulty in finding a fire extinguisher (NFPA, 1980). In the MGM Grand Fire, the main killer was not the fire, but the black smoke which engulfed the ventilation system. The blame game has been played significantly in reference to the fire. Although hotel executives are at fault for not installing sprinklers, the NFPA states that there were considerable other major violations: code enforcement violations, fire and safety violations, installation errors, flaws with regard to design, and materials which made the fire significantly worse than it should have ever been. During the fire, the fire alarm system was not activated since no had the decency to hit the alarm button. Moreover, there were 83 building code violations (NFPA, 1980).
For a building which cost over a $106 million dollars, this borders on absurd. Soon after the fire, Kenny Gruinn was appointed on a special committee to study Nevada fire safety laws by a judge involved in the case (Craighead, 2009). His report stated empirically: ALL CASINOS IN NEVADA NEED SPRINKLERS. This became the sine qua non of all casino nomenclature following the fire. This was the most significant code development from the case. People noticed and acted—they knew the criminal and civil consequences next time around would not be so merciful. The MGM Grand fire re-vamped Nevada’s archaic fire and safety codes and enforced stringent retrofit sprinkler laws; today the state of Nevada remains one of the safest states in reference to fire and safety (Craighead, 2009).
Guests can visit and vacation knowing very well that their lives are no longer in danger. An important piece of legislation was passed which clearly outlined the fire safety codes for high-rises: the 1981 Las Vegas Retrofit Ordinance (Craighead, 2009). This bill required smoke controlled systems for all hotels operating in Las Vegas. This included old and new hotels presently under construction. Codes and standards are the key ingredients for ensuring successful fire and safety regulations. These stringent codes must pass steep evaluations and testing procedures of the Building Division of Clark Country Department of Developmental Services (Craighead, 2009). There are a ton of requirements, specifications, and procedures which must be followed. The majority of these provisions were adopted from NFPA Standard 92A; it was referred to as, “Smoke Control Systems Utilizing Barriers and Pressure Differences.” Furthermore, they have adopted two important provisions: 2006 Mechanical Code and International Building Code (IBC). These additional measures further help control, re-enforce, and advocate safety measures (Craighead, 2009).
In sum, The MGM Grand fire caused not only the loss of innocent life, but paved the way for the considerable passage of legislation which curtails the negligence of hotel executives, building officials, and contractors. There was no reason for the MGM Grand fire to cause such havoc; it could have been totally avoided. The lessons learned from the tragic fire shall never be lost, but prove an important point. In the care of people, there should never be sub-standard codes.










References


Craighead, Geoff. High-Rise Security and Fire Safety. Butterworth—Heiman Publishing, New York. 2009.